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Abstract—Adversarial attacks have exposed serious vulnerabil-
ities in Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) through their ability
to force misclassifications through human-imperceptible pertur-
bations to DNN inputs. We explore a new direction in the
field of adversarial attacks by suggesting attacks that aim to
degrade the computational efficiency of DNNs rather than their
classification accuracy. Specifically, we propose and demonstrate
sparsity attacks, which adversarially modify a DNN’s inputs so as
to reduce sparsity (or the presence of zero values) in its internal
activation values. Exploiting sparsity in hardware and software
has emerged as a popular approach to improve DNN efficiency
in resource-constrained systems. The proposed attack increases
the execution time and energy consumption of sparsity-optimized
DNN implementations, raising concern over their deployment in
latency and energy-critical applications.
We propose a systematic methodology to generate adversarial
inputs for sparsity attacks by formulating an objective function
that quantifies the network’s activation sparsity, and minimizing
this function using iterative gradient-descent techniques. To
prevent easy detection of the attack, we further ensure that
the perturbation magnitude is within a specified constraint and
that the perturbation does not affect classification accuracy. We
launch both white-box and black-box versions of adversarial
sparsity attacks on image recognition DNNs and demonstrate that
they decrease activation sparsity by 1.16x-1.82x. On a sparsity-
optimized DNN accelerator, the attack results in degradations of
1.12x-1.59x in latency and 1.18x-1.71x in energy-delay product
(EDP). Additionally, we analyze the impact of various hyper-
parameters and constraints on the attack’s efficacy. Finally, we
evaluate defense techniques such as activation thresholding and
input quantization and demonstrate that the proposed attack is
able to withstand them, highlighting the need for further efforts
in this new direction within the field of adversarial machine
learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread success of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in
various machine learning applications, including image recog-
nition, speech recognition, and natural language processing,
has led to their deployment in several real-world products and
services [1]–[3]. State-of-the-art DNNs place immense compu-
tational and memory demands on the underlying computing
platforms on which they execute. Consequently, a wide range
of algorithmic, software and hardware techniques have been
proposed to improve the execution efficiency of DNNs.
Several recent efforts optimize DNN implementations by
exploiting sparsity, or the prevalence of zero values in DNN
weights and activations, to optimize storage and computation.
For example, sparsity-optimized DNN implementations may
store the sparse data-structures in a compact format to reduce
the memory requirements [4] and/or skip redundant multiply-
accumulate operations caused by zero-valued operands to
reduce their computational requirements [5]–[11]. We observe
that, in sparsity-optimized platforms, the execution time and
energy consumption of DNNs are strongly dependent on the
amount of sparsity present in the networks. Figure 1 depicts the
variation in latency of a sparsity-aware hardware accelerator [6]
when evaluated on the ImageNet dataset for the VGG16 [12]
network. As can be seen, increasing (decreasing) the activation
sparsity leads to proportional decreases (increases) in latency.
We leverage the aforementioned property to expose a vulnera-
bility of sparsity-optimized DNN implementations. Specifically,
we present an attack that adversarially perturbs the input so
as to significantly reduce sparsity in the internal activations
of the network. This greatly diminishes or eliminates the
benefits of sparsity optimizations, and leads to unantici-
pated increases in inference latency and energy consumption.
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Fig. 1: Impact of activation sparsity on
latency
For example,
an autonomous
self-driving car
is expected to
detect obstacles
or unforeseen
changes in the
environment
within around
600 milliseconds
[13]. In that time,
the Cnvlutin
accelerator can
process nearly 30 frames using the VGG16 DNN, assuming
an average activation sparsity of 45-50%. However, under
the influence of the attack (detailed results are presented in
Section VI), the average activation sparsity decreases by 1.79×
and the latency of the accelerator is increased by nearly 1.4×,
causing it to process only 21 frames in the available time. The
DNN could thus miss potentially critical data present in the
remaining frames. For ensuring correct real-time operation,
such an attack would require designers to over-design systems,
essentially losing the benefits from sparsity optimization. The
increased energy consumption resulting from sparsity attacks
could also potentially lead to pre-mature battery discharge in
battery-powered devices.
To realize adversarial sparsity attacks, we propose systematic
methodologies that extend the principles of conventional
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2adversarial attacks to identify the required input perturbations
for any given DNN and input. We consider both white-box
and black-box attack scenarios, which differ in the extent
of the attacker’s knowledge of the DNN model. In a white-
box scenario, where the attacker has full access to the model
parameters, we define an objective function that measures the
activation sparsity for a given input. We then utilize gradient-
descent-based techniques to identify the required distortions
that shift the input in the direction of decreasing the sparsity
objective function. In black-box scenarios wherein model
information is unavailable to the attacker, we demonstrate
transferability of sparsity-attacked inputs. Further, in both
cases, the attack is designed to be inconspicuous and cannot
be detected by mere inspection of the DNN’s functional
input and output. The end result is a very similar input that
has no net functional effect on the classification, but incurs
significantly reduced sparsity within the DNN and hence,
increased classification time and energy.
We analyze the effectiveness of the attack by studying its
performance under common defense techniques including input
quantization and activation thresholding that intend to counter
the attack’s impact by increasing activation sparsity. We find
that these defenses are unable to recover the reduction in
activation sparsity without sacrificing the accuracy of the
network. This underscores the strength of the attack and also
the need for future research efforts in developing specialized
defense techniques. Finally, we also study the impact of the
attack on different sparsity-optimized DNN platforms, including
an accelerator and a general-purpose processor.
In summary, the key contributions of this work are:
• We introduce adversarial sparsity attacks, a new class of
attacks that affect the latency and energy consumption of
DNNs on sparsity-optimized platforms by reducing the
amount of sparsity present in them.
• We propose systematic methodologies to introduce ad-
versarial perturbations to DNN inputs in a manner that
causes a decrease in activation sparsity without impacting
classification accuracy in both white-box and black-box
scenarios.
• We launch the attack on a set of 4 DNNs across 3
different datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet), and
demonstrate a 1.16×-1.82× decrease in activation sparsity
with no loss in accuracy, for both white and black box
attacks. We also demonstrate 1.12×-1.59× and 1.18×-
1.71× increase in execution time and energy-delay product
on a sparsity-optimized DNN accelerator.
• We investigate the effectiveness of three different defense
techniques and demonstrate that the attack is largely
impervious to these defenses, highlighting the need for
further efforts towards specialized defenses.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides
the necessary background on sparsity in DNNs as well as
conventional adversarial attacks. Section III describes sparsity
attacks and the proposed attack generation framework, and
Section IV discusses the defense techniques. The experimental
methodology used to evaluate sparsity attacks is described in
Section V. Section VI presents the results of applying sparsity
attacks to DNN benchmarks. Finally, Section VII concludes
the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
This section describes the different types of sparsity in DNNs
and their sources. It also presents some basic principles of
conventional adversarial attacks, which are utilized in the
proposed sparsity attack framework.
A. Sparsity in DNNs
Sparsity refers to the presence of zero-valued elements in
different DNN data structures like weights and activations.
Sparsity helps reduce the model size of DNNs and their overall
memory requirements through the use of compact sparse storage
formats. In addition, it also renders a large number of multiply-
and-accumulate operations on zero-valued operands redundant,
and skipping them helps reduce time and energy consumption
in DNN implementations [5]–[10].
Sparsity in DNNs can be broadly classified into two categories:
• Static Sparsity: In static sparsity, the number and loca-
tions of zero values remain constant across different inputs
to the network. Static sparsity arises in the static network
parameters, viz. weights, and is typically introduced
through pruning techniques [4].
• Dynamic Sparsity: In dynamic sparsity, the number and
locations of zero values vary across different inputs to the
network. Sparsity in activations is the primary example of
dynamic sparsity and is caused by the presence of ReLU
(Rectified Linear Unit) layers in the network, which zero
out all negative values. State-of-the-art DNNs are known
to contain significant dynamic sparsity. For example,
activation sparsity varies from 40-70% across the DNNs
we have considered in our experiments.
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Fig. 2: Variation in input activation
sparsity and execution time benefits
across 500 images for Cifar10-Conv2
on Cnvlutin
Figure 2 illustrates the
variation in dynamic
sparsity across a set
of 500 images from
Cifar10-Conv2, a net-
work trained on Cifar-
10 [14], with the archi-
tecture listed in Fig-
ure 8. We observe
a variation of nearly
1.4× across the differ-
ent images. The de-
gree of sparsity in a
DNN determines its
execution time and en-
ergy consumption on
sparsity-optimized platforms [5]–[11]. Thus, the execution time
of Cifar10-Conv2 varies by 1.38× for the same 500 images
on the Cnvlutin accelerator platform [6]. Our proposal of
3adversarial sparsity attacks exploits this property to modify
inputs to a DNN in a manner that reduces the amount of
dynamic sparsity, thereby negatively affecting its execution
time and energy consumption on sparsity-optimized platforms.
B. Adversarial Attacks on DNNs
Adversarial attacks [15] have exposed serious security vulnera-
bilities in DNNs, raising a concern with their deployment in
safety-critical applications like autonomous cars, unmanned
aerial vehicles and healthcare. To date, adversarial attacks have
focused on causing a neural network to misclassify an input
by introducing small perturbations (typically imperceptible to
human eyes).
Adversarial attacks can be classified as untargeted or targeted,
depending on whether the aim of the attack is to generally
degrade classification accuracy or to misclassify the input as
a specific incorrect class. These attacks can also further be
classified depending on the extent of information available
to the attacker about the DNN model. White-box attacks
assume that the attacker has complete knowledge of the network
structure and parameters in addition to the class labels, whereas
in black-box attacks the attacker is only aware of the class
labels and/or confidence scores, but not the network structure
and parameters. In many deployed systems, the fact that a DNN
is used for classification, the network structure, or the entire
model including weights are made public (e.g., DeepFace from
Facebook [16] and GPT3 from OpenAI [17]).
White-box attacks such as C&W[18] and MIM[19] calculate
the gradients of the classification loss function with respect to
the input. This gradient information is used to compute the
necessary input perturbations that increase the probability of
mis-classification. Black-box attacks, in contrast, are oblivious
to the model parameters, and typically only assume access to
the model’s output confidence scores for a given input. This
renders the critical gradient information unavailable. Popular
black-box attack strategies usually overcome this difficulty by
approximately estimating the gradients [20] or the required
perturbation directions [21]. For example, ZOO [20] estimates
the gradient of the classification probabilities at a particular
point in the input space by querying the user model repeatedly
to obtain the classification scores at several closely spaced input
points. The gradient is constructed by calculating the change
in the output classification scores observed for the very small
changes in the input values around the desired point. Other
common black-box strategies take advantage of the transferable
nature of the adversarial inputs [22].
Complementary to prior adversarial attacks, which aim to
impact the DNN’s accuracy, our proposed class of attacks, viz.
adversarial sparsity attacks instead affect the computational
efficiency of DNNs.
C. Timing Side Channel Attacks
The objective of timing side channel attacks, proposed in [23],
is to more effectively launch accuracy-based adversarial attacks
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Fig. 3: Adversarial Sparsity Attacks in White and Black Box
Settings
or membership inference attacks [24] in a black-box setting.
The attack utilizes the execution time of a network to infer
parameters like network depth. Using this information, the
attacker constructs a new network that can better mimic the
functionality of the unknown model, allowing it to launch a
stronger attack. However, the attack does not target or affect
the computational efficiency of the model on a hardware
platform and is thus orthogonal to the adversarial sparsity
attacks proposed in our work.
The following sections describe the details of adversarial
sparsity attacks.
III. ADVERSARIAL SPARSITY ATTACKS
Adversarial sparsity attacks are a new class of attacks that
perturb DNN inputs so as to decrease the sparsity of activation
values, with the eventual goal of increasing DNN execution
time and energy on sparsity-optimized platforms. This section
presents an overview of these attacks and details the proposed
attack generation framework.
A. Threat Models
In adversarial sparsity attacks, the intent of the attacker is to
induce high classification time and energy consumption through
carefully crafted input perturbations. For a pronounced impact
on the user system’s battery life and classification latency, the
attack needs to be persistent, i.e., launched on several inputs
over a long period of time. To facilitate this, the attack must
evade trivial detection mechanisms such as observing the input
and functional output of a DNN for anomalies. Specifically, the
attack minimizes its impact on the input by adding perturbations
that are bounded within a specified Lp limit, so that the resultant
adversarial input is similar to the unperturbed input. In addition,
the attack should ensure that the classification label assigned to
an adversarial input is identical to that predicted by the network
on the original input and consequently, the functional output
of the DNN remains unchanged. In other words, the attacker
must craft an adversarial sample that is assigned the same
label, regardless of the correctness of the original classification.
Overall, the criteria for a successful sparsity attack can be
summarized as:
41) The added perturbation must cause a significant reduction
in activation sparsity
2) To prevent detection of the attack by observing the output,
the classification prediction must be the same as that of
the unperturbed input
3) To prevent detection of the attack by visual inspection
of the input, the added distortions to the input must be
imperceptible, i.e., within a specified Lp bound
Criterion 3 can be relaxed in scenarios wherein there is no
supervision of the input image, such as autonomous navigation
[25]. In such scenarios, the only feedback available to the user
is the credibility or accuracy of the navigation - an aspect
taken care of by satisfying Criterion 2. With the above criteria
for a successful attack in place, we now discuss different
attack scenarios that place varying constraints on the attacker’s
knowledge of the user model.
Figure 3 illustrates white-box and black-box scenarios for
sparsity attacks. The attacker in a white-box scenario has full
access to the user model’s parameters such as the weights,
and can consequently determine the internal activations. The
attacker can thus calculate the overall activation sparsity for
a given input, as well as its classification performance. In
contrast, the attacker in a black-box scenario cannot access the
model’s internals, including weights and activations. Similar
to state-of-the-art black-box attacks [20], [21] we assume that
the attacker can query an input to obtain the output confidence
scores. However, the attacker is prevented from evaluating the
overall activation sparsity for a given input.
B. Attack Strategies
We will now elucidate the attack strategies developed to realize
sparsity attacks in both white-box and black-box scenarios.
1) White-Box Sparsity Attacks: The proposed white-box attack
uses a composite objective function that combines the overall
activation sparsity with the classification loss of the network for
a given input. Next, it calculates the gradient of this objective
function with respect to the input to reveal the relationship
between changes in the input and the corresponding effect
on the activation sparsity and classification loss. Finally, by
incorporating these gradients into iterative gradient-descent
techniques, the attacker obtains the necessary perturbations that
decrease activation sparsity while minimizing the classification
loss.
The objective function, L, that combines the overall activation
sparsity and classification loss for a given input can be described
by Equation 1.
L(x) = Lsparsity(x) + c · Lce(x) (1)
where c is the Lagrange multiplier or the trade-off constant,
Lsparsity estimates the overall activation sparsity across the
network for an input x, Lce measures the classification cross-
entropy loss of the input x with respect to the target class
Algorithm 1 Creating inputs for adversarial sparsity attacks
Input: xclean (Clean Input), f (DNN model), Lsparsity and
Lce (Objective function terms),  (Maximum L2 distortion),
iter (L2 distortion per iteration), Omax and Imax (Maxi-
mum outer and inner-loop iterations), cin, cmin and cmax
(Initial, min. and max. value of trade-off constant)
Output: xadv (Adversarial input)
c = cin, o = 1
while o < Omax
x0 = xclean, i = 1, g0 = 0
while i < Imax
L(xi) = Lsparsity(xi) + c*Lce(xi)
gi = µgi−1 + ∇xL(xi)
xi+1 = xi - iter* gi||gi||2
xi+1 = Clip[0,1,,xclean] (xi+1)
i = i+ 1
if argmax(f(xadv)) 6= argmax(f(xclean))
c = (c + cmax)/2
else
c = (c+cmin)/2
o = o+1
assigned by the network on the original unperturbed input. We
note here that Lce is not calculated against the ground-truth
labels, since our objective is to mimic the DNN’s behavior on
unperturbed inputs.
The intent of the attacker is to calculate input perturbations that
minimize the measure of the objective function L, i.e., cause
a reduction in activation sparsity and specified classification
loss. The gradient of L with respect to the input image is
thus used to calculate the required perturbations that push the
input in the direction of decreasing activation sparsity, while
maintaining the same classification accuracy, i.e., keeping the
predicted labels to be identical to that of the original input.
Intuitively, the choice of the trade-off constant c impacts the
performance of the sparsity attack - it is important to choose
a value of c that achieves a high degradation in activation
sparsity without sacrificing accuracy. Further, it must also be
ensured that the added perturbations are within the maximum
L2 distortion allowed, i.e., Criterion 3. The entire process that
addresses these aspects is outlined in Algorithm 1.
The functioning of Algorithm 1 can be explained in two
parts. First, for a particular value of the trade-off constant
c, the algorithm uses gradient-descent techniques (Lines 4-
9) to calculate the perturbations (L2 bounded) that decrease
activation sparsity while maintaining similar classification
predictions. Next, to maximize the performance further, the
algorithm employs simple binary-search techniques that identify
an optimal c (Lines 10-14).
Focusing on the gradient-descent process first, we begin by
initializing the perturbed input x0 to the original input xclean
(line 3). In every iteration i, the gradient of L(xi) with respect
to the input is evaluated at xi (line 5). There are several
gradient-descent based optimization algorithms that can be
incorporated to update the input. In our experiments, we find
5that utilizing standard gradient descent with a momentum-
based update [26] typically provides the best results, as shown
in line 6. The momentum parameter µ is set to 0.9 in all
our experiments. Using the gradient values, a small distortion
is calculated so as to push xi in the direction of decreasing
sparsity and classification loss (line 7). Finally, at the end of
the iteration i, the perturbed input is clipped so as to ensure
the added distortions are within the L2 bound , and does not
exceed the permissible input value range i.e., [0, 1] (line 8).
This process is continued for Imax iterations.
At the end of Imax iterations, the binary search process for
finding an optimal c comes into play. As can be seen, the
classification prediction of the perturbed input is first evaluated
and compared against the prediction on the original input (line
10) - if the labels do not match, the priority of the Lce term
is increased by increasing c as indicated in line 11. On the
contrary, if the labels do match, this indicates that the attacker
can afford to assign the Lsparsity term a higher priority, by
decreasing c (line 13). Starting the next outer-loop iteration
the perturbation and gradient variables are reset(line 3), and
the process is continued until Omax iterations are complete.
The output of the algorithm is an adversarially perturbed input
xadv that successfully decreases the activation sparsity of the
user system, while satisfying Criterion 2 and 3 as well.
Naturally, the convergence and the resulting performance of
Algorithm 1 is contingent on the specific forms of the Lce
and Lsparsity functions. We will now describe the process
of suitably designing these objective function terms that play
a crucial role in determining the efficacy of the adversarial
sparsity attack.
Design of Lsparsity: For successfully satisfying Criterion 1,
the function representing Lsparsity must effectively quantify
the overall activation sparsity across the network for a given
input. Ideally, we could apply a step function on the input
activations of every layer in the network to determine whether
it is non-zero, and perform a summation of the resulting step-
function outputs across the network to determine the total
activation sparsity. However, the objective function must also be
differentiable in the input activation range so that the gradients
can be calculated in Line 6 of Algorithm 1. To that end, we
devise continuous versions of the step function to detect non-
zero activation values in the network.
We specifically use Tanh and Sigmoid functions, described by
the following equations, in our framework:
Tanh(β, act) =
eβ·act − e−β·act
eβ·act + e−β·act
(2)
Sigmoid(β, act) =
1
e−β·act + 1
(3)
where act is an input activation to a layer in the network. Both
the functions are differentiable, and the value of β can be
increased to improve their resemblance to the step function.
An estimate of the number of non-zero neurons across all the
layers of the network is obtained by summing the individual
input activations with the tanh or sigmoid functions applied
on top of them. We define such an estimate E as:
E(x) =
∑
L
∑
Nl
F (I(nl,x)) (4)
where F refers to the sigmoid or tanh function and I(nl,x)
refers to the nth input activation of layer l for a given input,
x. To estimate the overall degree of zero-valued neurons, E
must be negated before application in Algorithm 1. We further
normalize E to the total number of neurons in the network.
The final Lsparsity can thus be expressed as:
Lsparsity(x) = −E(x)
k
(5)
where k refers to the network’s total neuron count.
Figure 4 illustrates the efficacy of the sparsity attack on Cifar10-
Conv2, using tanh and sigmoid objective functions with varying
β. As can be seen for both the tanh and sigmoid functions,
the decrease in activation sparsity obtained by the attack
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in activation sparsity
improves with increasing β
until saturation is reached
at some point. Across all
networks, for a particular
value of β, we observe that
the tanh function tends to
perform better than the sig-
moid function by decreasing
the final activation sparsity
by an additional 8% on an
average. We report the β
values to be used in conjunc-
tion with the tanh function
for the best results on the
networks considered in our
experiments in Section V.
To ensure a higher impact of reduced sparsity on the execution
time and energy consumption of different sparsity-optimized
platforms, we also augment the objective function Lsparsity
with some hardware-specific parameters. We specifically weigh
the sparsity terms corresponding to each layer with values
proportional to their relative execution time and energy con-
sumption on a given hardware platform. In other words, time
and energy intensive layers are assigned higher weight values in
the overall objective function. The modified sparsity estimator
function E can thus be described by the following equation.
E(x) =
∑
L
Wl
∑
Nl
F (I(nl,x)) (6)
where Wl is the weight assigned to layer l and is set to be
equal to the relative runtime or energy consumption of that
layer on the considered hardware platform.
Design of Lce: As per Criterion 2, the classification label
predicted by the network on the perturbed input must match
the label assigned by the network on the unperturbed input.
Accordingly, Lce must measure the classification loss of the
6input with respect to the original predicted label. Akin to the
design of objective functions for targeted attacks [19], we
define Lce as the softmax cross-entropy loss with respect to
the ‘target’ label y. For original and adversarial inputs xclean
and xadv this can be expressed as:
y = argmax(f(xclean)) (7)
Lce(xadv) = −log( e
f(xadv)y∑N
l=1 e
f(xadv)l
) (8)
where f(x) is the pre-softmax output of the DNN for input
x, y is the class label assigned by the network on the original
input xclean, N is the number of classes and f(x)l is the
pre-softmax output with respect to class l.
In summary, white-box sparsity attacks exploit their knowledge
of the model parameters by utilizing iterative gradient-descent
based techniques to find the required perturbations that satisfy
Criteria 1-3.
2) Black-Box Sparsity Attacks: In this subsection, we describe
strategies to launch a sparsity attack in a black-box scenario.
As shown in Figure 3, the attacker in a black-box scenario can
access only the classification performance of the network and is
unaware of the network weights, activations, and consequently,
the overall sparsity. This precludes the attacker from directly uti-
lizing the gradient-descent-based attack methodology described
in Algorithm 1. As mentioned in Section II, conventional state-
of-the-art black-box attacks work around this challenge by
iteratively determining approximations of either the gradient of
the classification performance [20], or the appropriate direction
of perturbation [21]. These approximations solely require the
classification confidence scores for a given input, and do not
require any knowledge of the network weights. Unfortunately,
we cannot adopt similar techniques in black-box sparsity attacks
as the amount of sparsity in a network cannot be estimated
from the queried classification scores of the user model. Hence,
we explore alternative techniques for launching a black-box
sparsity attack.
First, we investigate whether adversarial sparsity attack inputs
are transferable between different networks, i.e., whether
an adversarial input generated for a known substitute (or
surrogate) model [22] using the white-box technique can have
the desired effects on the unknown user model. To evaluate such
transferability, we first perform the white-box attack described
in the previous subsection on Cifar10-Conv2 (the substitute
model, and whose architecture is listed in Section V), and
subsequently transfer the images to 3 different Cifar10 models
whose architectures are listed for reference in Figure 5, but
assumed to be unknown to the attacker.
On deploying the white-box attack on Cifar10-Conv2, the
average decrease in activation sparsity across the test dataset
is 1.56×, for no loss in classification accuracy. In Figure 6
we depict the decrease in activation sparsity and classification
accuracy incurred by the unknown models when these images
are passed through them. For the sake of comparison, we
Model Architecture
Model 1 Conv(3*3*32), ReLU, (2*2 Max Pool), Conv(3*3*32), ReLU, (2*2 Max 
Pool), Conv(3*3*64), ReLU, Conv(3*3*64), ReLU, FC(512), ReLU, 
FC(10), Softmax
Model 2 Conv(5*5*64), ReLU, (3*3 Max Pool), Conv(5*5*64), ReLU, (3*3 Max 
Pool),  Conv(3*3*64), ReLU, Conv(3*3*32),ReLU, FC(512), ReLU, 
FC(10), Softmax
Model 3 Conv(3*3*32), ReLU, (2*2 Max Pool),  Conv(3*3*32), ReLU, 
Conv(3*3*32), ReLU, FC(64), ReLU, FC(10), Softmax
Fig. 5: Architecture of different unknown models
also illustrate the performance of the white-box sparsity
attack on all three models. Across all unknown models,
it is observed that the decrease in activation sparsity ex-
hibited by simply transferring the images is only 10-12%
lower than that obtained by the white-box attack on the
same model. However, unfortunately, there is a significant
decrease in classification accuracy - nearly 60%. Hence,
while sparsity-attacked images appear to be transferable
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ity of the adversarial sparsity at-
tack
in terms of the reduc-
tion in activation sparsity,
classification accuracy is
clearly not maintained.
We find this to be inline
with the results reported
in several accuracy-based
black-box attack research
efforts such as [20], [27],
which observe that un-
like untargeted attacks,
targeted attacks exhibit
poor transferability, and
require specialized tech-
niques such as [20], [21],
[27] for achieving high
attack success rates.
To resolve the aforemen-
tioned challenges, we propose a two-stage framework that first
derives attack inputs on a known substitute model, transfers
those inputs to the unknown model only for the purpose of
reducing sparsity and (if needed) finally applies an accuracy-
based targeted black-box attack to restore the original prediction
label. Figure 7 summarizes the overall black-box sparsity attack
process. As shown in the Figure 7, the first stage generates
adversarial sparsity images on a substitute model using the
white-box attack mechanism of Algorithm 1, with c set to zero.
In the second stage, to ensure that predictions are maintained,
all mis-predicted images are passed through the ZOO targeted
accuracy-based black-box attack[20]. ZOO repeatedly queries
and observes the changes in classification performance for
some closely-spaced input points to determine the gradients
for a particular input and utilizes these gradients to find the
necessary perturbations to change the network output to the
targeted class. As in white-box sparsity attacks, the target
class is the class predicted by the unknown network on the
unperturbed input. Experimental results indicate that although
the second stage does not factor activation sparsity, the impact
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Fig. 7: Two Stages of the Black-Box Sparsity Attack
on the decrease in activation sparsity achieved by the first stage
is minimal i.e, within 2%, across the networks considered. We
also place additional constraints to ensure that the total L2
distortion introduced by both stages, 1 and 2 respectively, is
within the specified limit .
In summary, our black-box sparsity attack is realized in two
stages that first transfer adversarial sparsity attack inputs created
on a substitute model and then apply targeted black-box attacks
to restore the functional output if needed.
IV. POTENTIAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES
In this section, we outline potential defense techniques against
adversarial sparsity attacks and evaluate their efficacy. The
defense techniques broadly aim to restore activation sparsity,
thereby countering the impact of the sparsity attack. In the
process, successful defenses should not negatively impact the
classification accuracy of the DNN as well. It is further imper-
ative that the chosen defense be computationally lightweight-
it would be counter-productive if the defense itself added a
significant latency or energy overhead in order to prevent the
latency or energy increase incurred by the attack.
We specifically discuss the key principles of three different
computationally light-weight defense techniques below.
A. Activation Thresholding
Activation thresholding, as the name suggests, involves setting
all activations below a certain non-zero threshold to zero,
thereby increasing the overall activation sparsity. The thresholds
must be set to values that cause no loss in accuracy on
unperturbed inputs. Further, the threshold values can be
identified at a per-layer granularity. In our implementation,
we initialize the threshold of each layer to the mean activation
value of that layer as measured on the adversarial set, and
iteratively increase or decrease its value till an increase in
activation sparsity is obtained for a tolerable loss in accuracy.
B. Adversarial Training
Adversarial training [28] is a popular defense technique used
in classical accuracy-based adversarial attacks. It involves
generating adversarial examples on the clean training set, and
then retraining the model with the original training examples
augmented with the adversarially generated samples. Such
techniques have shown great success at mitigating the impact
of attacks like FGSM [29], PGD [30], etc.
Although adversarial training was formulated as a defense
technique to mitigate accuracy-based attacks, we investigate
its suitability for adversarial sparsity attacks. The aim of
adversarial training in this context is to increase the activation
sparsity of the adversarial inputs to match that of unperturbed
input samples. We generate the inputs for adversarial training
using the white-box techniques discussed in Section III, and
the parameters listed in Section V.
C. Input Smoothing
Adversarial sparsity attack distortions are calculated perturba-
tions added to the input so as to reduce activation sparsity while
maintaining classification accuracy. We investigate whether the
impact of the sparsity attack can be nullified by input smoothing
techniques, namely input quantization and compression, similar
to the techniques used in [31] to defend against conventional
adversarial attacks. We select appropriate parameters for each
smoothing technique such that they mitigate the impact of
the sparsity attack while incurring no loss in accuracy. For
example, we select the bit-width or compression quality which
provide the best defense against the attack. Our formula for
k-bit input quantization applied on an input x is expressed as:
xq =
1
2k
· round((2k) · x) (9)
Input compression applies to images, and as the name suggests,
consists of applying image compression to the image to remove
high-frequency artifacts. To realize input compression with
quality k, we pass the input image x to the encode jpeg
method from TensorFlow [32] with quality set to k.
For all of the above defenses, we assume that the attacker does
not adapt to the defense technique. However, as we will be
demonstrating in Section VI, none of the defenses explored here
show significant mitigation of the sparsity attack - to reduce
the impact of the sparsity attack by even 8% (in activation
sparsity) on the adversarial set, a 4% loss in unperturbed
accuracy must be incurred, which is an unacceptable tradeoff
in most practical scenarios. This emphasizes the strength of
the sparsity attack to withstand conventional defenses. We
do not consider other popular techniques such as GANs
[33] or variational auto-encoders [34] used in accuracy-based
attacks as they incur significant computational overheads
themselves. Nevertheless, this may be an interesting direction
to investigate as part of future efforts.
A possible detection mechanism involves measuring the latency
or the energy consumption of the hardware system. If the energy
consumption goes beyond a certain range, the user could be
alerted. We note however that while this aids in detection of the
attack, it does not resolve or counter the impact of the attack.
Further research is needed to produce a successful defense
technique, which will be explored as in future work.
8V. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
Datasets and Model Architectures. We demonstrate the
effectiveness of adversarial sparsity attacks on 4 different
image-recognition DNNs across 3 different datasets (MNIST
[35], CIFAR-10 [14] and ImageNet [36]). The details of the
architectures are listed in Figure 8. The ImageNet-Conv and
Cifar10-Conv2 architectures are taken from [12], [37]. The
white-box and black-box attacks are conducted on the full test
set, except in the case of the black-box attack launched on
ImageNet-Conv wherein we report results for 1000 randomly
selected test set images. The reduction in activation sparsity
inflicted by the attack does not vary significantly across
images(<5%). We report the average reduction in activation
sparsity, and the corresponding increase in classification latency
and energy-delay product for each network in Section VI.
Datas
et
Name #Layers Architecture Acc %
Conv FC
MNIST Mnist-
Conv
4 2 Conv(3*3*20), ReLU, Conv(3*3*20), ReLU, (2*2 
Max Pool), Conv(3*3*20),ReLU, 
Conv(3*3*20),ReLU, FC(500), ReLU, FC(10), 
Softmax
99.45
CIFAR
10
Cifar10-
Conv1
4 2 Conv(3*3*32), ReLU, Conv(3*3*32), ReLU, (2*2 
Max Pool), Conv(3*3*64), ReLU, Conv(3*3*64), 
ReLU, (2*2 Max Pool), FC(512), ReLU, FC(10), 
Softmax
89.6
Cifar10-
Conv2
9 - AllConvNet 90.9
Image
Net
ImageN
et-Conv
13 3 VGG16 71.3
Fig. 8: Employed model architectures
The attack framework is implemented using TensorFlow [32].
We utilize the software framework provided in [20] to realize
the second stage of the black-box attack. The different hyper-
parameters used by white-box and black-box attacks are listed
in Figures 9(a) and 9(b), respectively. Additionally, for the
white-box attack, we set Omax to 1, and cin, cmin and cmax to
0.5, 0 and 1, respectively, in all our experiments. The optimality
of these hyper-parameters is discussed in Section VI-A. The
first stage of the black-box attack is conducted using the same
parameters listed in Figure 9(a). The substitute models used
in this step are discussed in Section VI-B.
Parameter Value
Binary Search Steps 1
Initial Constant 0.5
Number of iterations 10000
Learning rate 0.002
Para-
meter
MNIST
-Conv
Cifar10
-Conv1
Cifar10
-Conv2
ImageNet
-Conv
𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟(𝐿2) 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
𝜀 (𝐿2) 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8
𝐼𝑚𝑎𝑥 75 100 100 100
𝛽 15 16 20 22
(a) (b)
Fig. 9: Hyper-parameter values used for a) White-Box sparsity
attack and b) Stage 2 of the Black-Box sparsity attack
Sparsity-optimized platforms. We evaluated the effects of
adversarial sparsity attacks on two different sparsity-optimized
platforms, namely, the Cnvlutin DNN accelerator [6] and the
SPARCE general-purpose processor [8]. The micro-architectural
details of each of these platforms are listed in Figure 10.
For measuring execution times on Cnvlutin, we develop a
cycle-accurate simulator using the details provided in [6]. Our
developed simulator closely matches the execution time and
energy consumption values reported in [6] for a given network.
We utilize a simulator provided to us by the authors of SPARCE
for measuring execution times and energy consumption. For
both platforms, the execution time and energy consumption is
obtained for the unperturbed and adversarial inputs.
Parameter Value
Frequency 1 GHz
Area 70 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚2
Size 65 nm
Num. Of PEs 16
Parameter Value
Processor Config. ARMv8-A, In-order
SPARCE Config. 20 SASA table entries, 
32 SpRF entries
L1 Cache Split I&D, 32KB I cache, 
64KB D cache
L2 Cache Unified 2MB
(a) (b)
Fig. 10: Micro-architectural details for a) Cnvlutin and b)
SPARCE
VI. RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of our experiments
demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed adversarial
sparsity attacks.
A. White-Box Sparsity Attacks
1) Impact on Activation Sparsity, Execution time and EDP:
We first evaluate the decrease in activation sparsity, and
corresponding increases in execution time and energy-delay
product, resulting from white-box adversarial sparsity attacks.
Decrease in Activation Sparsity: The decrease in activation
sparsity achieved by the white-box sparsity attack under two
different perturbation constraints is shown in Figure 11. In
certain scenarios where human supervision of both the input and
output of the DNN is present, it is necessary that the sparsity
attack meets all criteria listed in Section III. Specifically,
the added input distortions should be imperceptible, i.e.,
constrained within the L2 bound specified in Figure 9. We refer
to these attack scenarios as constrained. However, in scenarios
such as autonomous self-driving where there is no human
supervision of the input, this criterion can be relaxed, i.e., the
added perturbations can be of any magnitude provided the pixel
values are within a valid range i.e., [0,1]. The only behavior
observable to the user in such scenarios is the correctness of
the classification. This is considered by the attack through
Criterion 2, i.e., no change in classification output. Such an
attack scenario is referred to as unconstrained, wherein it is
sufficient to satisfy just Criteria 1 and 2. Across the networks
considered the proposed white-box sparsity attack achieves a
1.16×-1.52× (average: 1.26×) decrease in activation sparsity
for the constrained case. These values increase to 1.55×-1.82×
(average: 1.71×) for the unconstrained scenario.
As the activation sparsity of the networks considered vary from
50%-70%, a trivial limit for the maximum reduction in sparsity
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Fig. 11: Impact of white-box adversarial sparsity attacks on
activation sparsity, execution time and EDP on Cnvlutin
possible would range from 2×-3×, i.e., bringing activation
sparsity down to 0. Such extremely low sparsity levels may be
hard to attain while maintaining accuracy. A more meaningful
and tight limit is difficult to establish because at the heart of
the attack lies a non-convex optimization problem with upto
tens of thousands of variables (corresponding to the input size).
The reduction in sparsity achieved by the attack translates
to varying degrees of execution time and energy increase
depending on the DNN, as discussed next.
Increase in Execution Time: Figure 11 also shows the
impact of adversarial sparsity attacks on the execution time of
different networks on the Cnvlutin [6] accelerator. We observe a
slowdown of 1.12×-1.43× (average: 1.20×) across all networks
for the constrained scenario, which increases to 1.37×-1.59×
(average: 1.49×) for the unconstrained case. Comparing results
across datasets, we note that for some datasets, sparsity may
be present in the input image itself, allowing the sparsity attack
to also target the first layer of the network in addition to
the subsequent layers. Specifically, the images in the MNIST
dataset are sparse (∼80%), while the CIFAR-10 and ImageNet
datasets exhibit minimal (0-0.3%) sparsity in the input. Thus,
for the CIFAR-10 and ImageNet networks, decreases in sparsity
and the corresponding impact on execution time and energy
are possible only from the second convolutional layer onwards.
As a result, networks with comparatively smaller runtimes
for the first convolutional layer, such as Cifar10-Conv2 and
ImageNet-Conv feel the impact of decreased sparsity in a more
pronounced fashion unlike networks such as Cifar10-Conv1,
whose first convolutional layer alone nearly takes up 26% of
the total runtime.
Increase in EDP: We utilize Energy-Delay Product (EDP) as
a metric to evaluate the effect of adversarial sparsity attacks on
energy efficiency of DNN execution. Sparsity attacks cause an
increase in energy consumption due to the higher number of
operations to be performed. This results in a 1.18×-1.53×
(average: 1.30×) increase in EDP for Cnvlutin when the
perturbations are constrained. When the constraints are relaxed,
the increase in EDP ranges from 1.47×-1.71× (average: 1.6×).
2) Impact on the activation sparsity distribution: We
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Fig. 12: Distribution of activation sparsity
before and after application of the attack
observe the
change in the
activation
sparsity
distribution
across the
test dataset
images as a
result of the
sparsity attack.
Figure 12
depicts a box-
whisker plot of
the activation
sparsity distribution on all networks, before and after the
application of the sparsity attack. As marked by the red
arrows, the worst case sparsity of the adversarial inputs is
1.58×-1.78× lower than the worst case sparsity of the clean
inputs. Clearly, even if designers account for the worst case
sparsity present in the clean inputs, the attack reduces sparsity
further by a significant degree, causing inference time and
energy to exceed the limits of even a conservative design.
Additionally, we also provide a visualization of the distribution
of values at the output of a convolutional layer prior to the
application of the ReLU activation. In Figure 13 we depict the
pre-ReLU activations at the output of the first convolutional
layer of Cifar10-Conv2 before and after the attack has been
launched. As indicated by the median values of the clean
and adversarial samples, under the influence of the attack the
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Fig. 13: Distribution of activation values at
the output of the first convolutional layer
of Cifar10-Conv2
negative pre-
ReLU activatons
are shifted
towards the right,
i.e., the activation
value distribution
becomes more
positive. This
leads to a
decrease in post-
ReLU activation
sparsity. However,
note that the pre-
ReLU activations
are limited to
values of small
magnitude, which
helps in preserving the network output, and hence, accuracy.
3) Analyzing impact of different hyper-parameters:
Impact of c: We now analyze the performance of Algorithm 1
in terms of the hyper-parameter c, i.e., the trade-off space
between achieving a significant decrease in activation sparsity
while incurring no loss in classification accuracy. At c = 0,
Algorithm 1 solely focuses on reducing the activation sparsity
of the network, and does not factor classification performance.
On Mnist-Conv, this point translates to nearly 1.85× decrease
in activation sparsity on average across images, but a 70%
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Fig. 14: Impact of c on performance
of Algorithm 1
decrease in classifica-
tion performance. Inter-
estingly, Algorithm 1
identifies a higher value
at c = 0.3, at which
there is absolutely no
loss in classification ac-
curacy and 1.83× de-
crease in activation spar-
sity - merely 2% below
the reduction in activa-
tion sparsity obtained at
c = 0. These results
indicate the ability of
the algorithm to identify
points on the objective landscape that ensure virtually no impact
on classification accuracy, whilst only marginally compromising
on the decrease in activation sparsity.
Impact of Omax and Imax: In Figure 14, the presence of
a plateau-region in both the sparsity and accuracy curves
for a wide range of c values indicates the low sensitivity
of the performance of Algorithm 1 to c in this range - an
insight that we exploit to drastically reduce the number of
binary-search step iterations to find an optimal c. Across
our networks, providing any cin in the range of 0.5 to 1
achieves adequate results in merely 1 outer-loop iteration. This
is further underscored in Figure 15, which depicts the minimal
impact of increasing Omax on the performance of Algorithm 1
when cmin= 0.2, cin= 0.6 and cmax= 1, in the context of
Cifar10-Conv2. Across all curves, for each outer-loop iteration
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Fig. 15: Impact of Omax and Imax on performance of
Algorithm 1
it typically takes around 40-50 inner-loop iterations for the
accuracy to converge, and an additional 20-40 iterations for the
decrease in activation sparsity to saturate, with higher Omax
requiring slightly fewer inner-loop iterations. All values of
Omax considered varying from 1 to 5 ensure correct predictions
after the total Omax·Imax iterations have completed. More
importantly, we observe that higher values of Omax, which
engage in finding a better c than cin only provide at most
2-3% improvement in the decrease in activation sparsity, over
Omax = 1. Therefore, across our networks, we conduct our
white-box attacks with Omax set to 1, ensuring a runtime-
efficient attack with little to no sacrifice in performance.
4) Runtime Analysis: We list the runtimes involved in launch-
ing the white-box sparsity attack on each network in Fig-
ure 16, with all experiments conducted on a single NVIDIA-
RTX2080Ti GPU. For reference, we also compare our runtimes
against state-of-the-art accuracy-based attacks namely Projected
Gradient Descent (PGD) [30] and Carlini and Wagner(C&W)
[18] on the same networks, for an equal number of total
iterations. As observed, the runtime costs of our attack are
on average only marginally higher than PGD (by 18%), and
faster than C&W (by 6%). This highlights the computational
feasibility of the proposed adversarial sparsity attacks.
Attack Setting Attack MNIST-
Conv
Cifar10-
Conv1
Cifar10-
Conv2
ImageNet
-Conv
White Box Sparsity Attack 0.14 min 0.18 min 0.41 min 20 min
C&W 0.15 min 0.19 min 0.42 min 22 min
PGD 0.11 min 0.16 min 0.34 min 18 min
Black Box Sparsity Attack 1.84 min 4.2 min 5.24 min 78 min
ZOO 1.7 min 4 min 4.8 min 57 min
Fig. 16: Runtimes per image for sparsity attacks and conven-
tional accuracy-based attacks
B. Black-box attacks
1) Impact on Activation Sparsity, Execution Time and EDP:
We study the effect of black-box sparsity attacks on all networks
for the unconstrained distortion scenario, and demonstrate
the increase in execution time and EDP on the Cnvlutin
accelerator. For the Cifar10 and MNIST networks, we use
Model 1 described in Figure 5 as the substitute model,
and employ the VGG-19 [12] architecture as the substi-
tute when attacking the ImageNet network. The white-box
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Fig. 17: Impact on Activation Sparsity,
Latency and EDP for Black-Box attacks
sparsity attack
causes a 1.53×
and 1.48× sparsity
reduction on
Model 1 for
the Cifar10 and
MNIST datasets
respectively, and
a 1.65× reduction
in sparsity for the
VGG-19 model.
As shown in
Figure 17, we
achieve a 1.43× - 1.67× decrease in activation sparsity,
which translates to 1.24×-1.5× increase in execution time,
and 1.35×-1.62× increase in EDP. These results demonstrate
that sparsity attacks can be effectively launched in black-box
scenarios as well.
2) Impact of Substitute Model on Performance: Figure 18
illustrates the impact of using different substitute models
when launching a black-box attack on Cifar10-Conv1 and
Cifar10-Conv2, with the models listed in Figure 5 used as
substitute models. The effectiveness of the transfer is dictated
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Fig. 18: Analyzing impact of Substi-
tute Model
by two factors: a) the
inherent vulnerability
of the unknown net-
work to the sparsity at-
tack and b) the vulner-
ability of the substi-
tute model deployed.
Our experiments sug-
gest that, the final
reduction in sparsity
achieved by the black-
box attack is generally
upper bounded by im-
pact of the white-box
attack on the same
DNN. Moreover, in
certain cases, if the
unknown model is highly susceptible to the attack, it can
exhibit a higher reduction in sparsity than that incurred by the
substitute model. This trend is observed when using Model 3 to
attack Cifar10-Conv1. Further, amongst the different substitute
models deployed, we empirically find that substitute models
that exhibit higher vulnerability to the white-box attack are
more likely to induce a transfer of higher potency.
3) Runtime Analysis: Figure 16 also lists the runtimes of
black-box attacks across different networks. The higher runtime
of the black-box sparsity attack compared to the white-box
version is attributed to the second stage, which employs a
targeted accuracy-based attack to ensure that the perturbed input
does not cause a change in the DNN’s output. Such targeted
black-box attacks have been reported to be significantly more
expensive to compute than their white-box counterparts. This is
due to the increased difficulty in estimating the gradients that
are critical towards attaining high success rates. For example,
conducting the black-box sparsity attack on Cifar10-Conv1 for
example takes 4.2 min per image, which is far higher than the
0.18 min per image required for the white-box sparsity attack.
Comparing the runtimes of black-box sparsity attacks against
that of the ZOO attacks on the same networks, we find that our
attack is on average merely 13% more expensive to compute,
due to the relatively small overhead of the first stage.
C. Analysis of defense techniques
In this subsection, we study the effectiveness of the defense
techniques discussed in Section IV against the white-box
attacks, in the unconstrained distortion scenario. Figure 19(a)
illustrates the trade-off between the loss in unperturbed accuracy
and the decrease in activation sparsity for the activation
thresholding defense. We report results for four configurations
that attempt to restore sparsity while incurring within 0%, 1%,
2% and 5% drop in unperturbed accuracy, respectively. The
configurations that provide no loss in accuracy have negligible
effect on the impact of the attack. Further, even with a 5% loss
in accuracy, the defense is only able to degrade the attack’s
impact on sparsity by 6-8% across networks.
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Fig. 19: Analyzing the impact of different defense techniques
The results for input quantization [Figure 19(c)] and compres-
sion [Figure 19(d)] tell a similar story. On Cifar10-Conv2
an input bit-width of 4, or a compression quality of 75
(out of 100) mitigates the attack’s impact by 5-6%, whilst
incurring a 5% drop in unperturbed accuracy. It is evident
that, to mitigate the impact of sparsity attacks considerably, the
defender must resort to using extremely low precision bitwidths
and compression qualities for the input, which generally cause
a severe reduction in unperturbed accuracy. We report similar
findings for adversarial training, as seen in Figure 19(b).
D. Evaluation on general-purpose processors
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Fig. 20: Impact of adversarial sparsity attacks on activation
sparsity, execution time and EDP on SPARCE
In this subsection, we analyze the impact of the sparsity attack
on a sparsity-optimized general purpose processor, SparCE. For
the sake of brevity, we consider the impact of the white-box
attack alone, and depict the resulting increases in latency and
EDP in Figure 20. The increase in latency is 1.04×-1.14×,
and the increase in EDP is 1.08×-1.30× - clearly lower than
the increase in latency and EDP affected on the Cnvlutin
accelerator. We attribute this to the fact that general-purpose
processor based platforms derive lower benefits from sparsity in
the first place due to overheads such as control instructions for
12
pointer arithmetic, loop counters, etc. Thus, it is not surprising
that they tend to show lower vulnerability to the sparsity attacks
compared to hardware accelerators.
VII. CONCLUSION
We present a new class of adversarial attacks that adversely
impact the execution time and energy consumption of DNNs on
sparsity-optimized platforms by introducing input perturbations
that cause a reduction in activation sparsity. The proposed
sparsity attacks differ from conventional accuracy-based attacks
as they do not affect classification accuracy, and can be
launched in both white and black-box settings. Across our
suite of 4 DNNs on 3 datasets, we achieve a 1.16×-1.82×
decrease in activation sparsity for no loss in classification
accuracy. We also demonstrate the impact of our attack on a
sparsity-optimized DNN accelerator, achieving a 1.12×-1.59×
increase in latency and a 1.18×-1.71× increase in EDP.
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